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ABSTRACT 
China  is  frequently  reported  as  the  source  of  many  politically 
motivated cyber-attacks. Yet, there have been very few studies on 
the people behind such attacks, also known as hacktivists. In this 
paper, we have taken a step back and studied some of the reasons 
behind  the  rise  of  freelance  hacktivism  emanating  from  China. 
Using  various  criminological  theories,  as  well  as  political  and 
sociological  approaches,  we  propose  a  novel  theoretical 
framework behind Chinese hacktivism. Furthermore, we present 
an  empirical  analysis  on  the  membership  growth  patterns  of 
online Chinese hacktivist forums and use the observed patterns to 
support our proposed framework. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Hacktivism  is  a  phenomenon  in  which  hacking  converges with 
political activism (Denning 2001, p. 263).  It is a phenomenon 
which has become even more newsworthy since a loose knit group 
of politically motivated hackers called “Anonymous” launched a 
series of high profile cyber-attacks against companies who had cut 
off services to Wikileaks due to the intense pressure from the US 
government. These “hacktivists” codenamed their series of attacks 
“Operation Payback” and this caught the attention of the media 
who  followed  the  event  with  increasing  interest and hyperbole, 
with the creation of emotive neologisms such as “cyberwar” and 
“cybergeddon" effectively captured a wide audience. Discussion 
about all forms of hacking tends towards the extreme end of the 
moral  panic/cybergeddon  rhetoric  with  state-sponsorship  often 
seen as propelling the activity at enemy infrastructures and this 
has done more to mystify than clarify (Wall 2008).  
This  reaction  highlights  a  lack  of  understanding  of  this 
phenomenon.  Hacktivism  is  a  subject  which  has  been  under 
researched  academically  and  there  has  been  an  over-reliance 
placed  on  the  knowledge  “shared”  by  the  various  stakeholders 
who have a vested interest in boosting demand for their products 
and  services.  Thus,  our  aim  in  this  paper  is  to  study  the  key 
characteristics of a specific form of hacktivism, both theoretically 
and empirically. Our focus is on freelance hacktivism emanating 
from  China  and  the  political  and  emotional  triggers  for  it.  We 
have  carried  out  an  extensive  empirical  study  on  the  Chinese 
hacktivists spanning from the very first Chinese hacktivist groups 
to several which are currently in operation. The empirical findings 
presented in this paper shed light on the operations of the Chinese 
hacktivists  and  demonstrates  how  powerful  social  and  political 
factors  shape  and  pattern  hacktivist  attacks.  Our  focus  in  this 
paper is how nationalistic patriotism is engendered by politically-
motivated national education programmes which, in turn, lead to a 
sense of relative deprivation resulting in humiliation that is deep-
seated  and  long-lasting.  This  emotion  has  been  termed 
ressentiment (Scheler 1915/1998). Our aim is to demonstrate the 
historical and political motivations of hacktivists and render them 
intelligible as opposed to the pathological folk devils of popular 
discourse.   
2.  TOWARDS A THEORETICAL MODEL 
OF HACKTIVISM 
We do not present in this paper a complete theory for hacktivism, 
or indeed, certain forms of hacktivism that derive from China. Our 
more modest aim is to begin to explain some of the patterns in 
membership  of  hacktivist  forums  that  we  later  present  and  the 
targets  chosen  for  the  attacks.  In  what  follows we  discuss  two 
related  ideas,  ressentiment  and  relative  deprivation,  that  we 
suggest go some way to explain the pattern and targets of Chinese 
hacktivism. 
2.1  Ressentiment and Relative Deprivation 
It is our contention that hacktivism in the Chinese context derives 
from  a  complex  social  and  emotional  mix  of  factors.  At  the 
emotional level, the feelings derive from a position that is more 
than just resentment. We will argue that humiliation is one of the 
key  variables,  but  it  is  an  enduring  sense  of  humiliation  as 
opposed  to  the  usual  definition  of  the  emotion  as  short-lived. 
Many scholars have linked this to the reasons for mass protest and 
collective  action  (Lacy  2011;  Jasper  2010;  Wang  2008). 
Humiliation  can  only  occur  where  there  is  an  outgroup  that  is 
thought to perceive us in a negative way. Consequently, a theory 
of  ingroup/outgroup  comparisons  is  presented  from  a  social 
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 psychological perspective that accounts for group interactions and 
identifications. We will go on to show how these have been linked 
to theories of relative deprivation (Webber 2007). We also wish to 
present an argument that locates hacktivism within a longer term 
emotional state that has been described by the term ressentiment. 
Nietzche‟s concept of ressentiment, elaborated and extended by 
Max  Scheler  (1915/1998),  refers  to  an  incurable and  persistent 
emotion characterised by hate and despising of selected outgroups. 
The feeling is one that can be felt at an individual level, as well as 
at  a  national  or  cultural  level.  An  entire  nation  can  be  said  to 
suffer ressentiment. In Scheler‟s discussion, ressentiment results 
in  an  impotent  inability  to  physically  and  verbally  express  the 
feeling.  Whereas  resentment  is  usually  fleeting  and  transitory, 
ressentiment  lingers  often  without  relief;  a  form  of  resignation 
(Meltzer and Musolf 2002). However, Meltzer and Musolf (2002) 
have  argued  that  a  sense  of  impotency  may  characterise 
ressentiment, but it is not inevitable. 
“Rather than a necessarily perdurable state, ressentiment-related 
passivity  may  at  times become a lengthy, dynamic,  transitional 
stage  between  treatment  defined  as  wrongful  and  retaliation  or 
rectification. That is, ressentient individuals or groups may come 
to  define  the  inducing  agent  as  either  intolerable  or  no  longer 
overpowering  and,  therefore,  susceptible  to  acts  of  revenge  or 
revolt”  (Musolf  and  Meltzer  2002,  p.250-251,  emphasis  in 
original)    
It is the perception that something can be done that may result in 
individual  or  collective  action.  Perhaps  the  key  additional 
criminological input of the work of Cloward and Ohlin (1960) can 
help us understand how, with the right opportunities, collective 
action  to  overcome  and  mitigate  the  feelings  of  impotent 
ressentiment can be achieved. Elaborating Robert Merton‟s idea 
that crime occurs in those who accept the American dream but 
reject the legitimate means to reach that goal, Cloward and Ohlin 
added the argument that access to illegitimate opportunities was 
also necessary to engage in specific criminal acts. Hacktivism is 
very  different  from  the  types  of  criminal  activity  Cloward  and 
Ohlin describe. But the notion that certain crimes can only take 
place  if  we  have  access  to  the  right  opportunities  for  their 
commission  is  pertinent  here.  Although  Merton‟s  theory  of 
anomie,  and  the  tradition  of  subcultural  theory  based  on  it 
(Merton 1938; Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin 1960), is deemed 
by  some  to  be  a  form  of  relative  deprivation  (Lea  and  Young 
1984/1993), it has been argued that we need to look at another 
theorist,  W.G.  Runciman,  for a more useful account  of relative 
deprivation and group or national conflict (Webber 2007).  
The concept of relative deprivation has appeared in many guises 
and  has  enjoyed  mixed  fortunes  since  W.G.  Runciman's  book, 
Relative Deprivation and Social Justice appeared in 1966. This 
was one of the fullest accounts of the concept up to that time. The 
following is a summary of the key idea:  
“If  A,  who  does  not  have  something  but  wants  it,  compares 
himself to B, who does have it, then A is 'relatively deprived' with 
reference to B. Similarly, if A's expectations are higher than B's, 
or if he was better off than B in the past, he may when similarly 
placed  to  B  feel  relatively  deprived  by  comparison  with  him” 
(Runciman 1966, p.10) 
Importantly,  relative  deprivation  bridges  the  gap  between 
objective,  even  structural,  forms  of  deprivation  (absolute 
deprivation)  and  the  subjective,  or  agent-level,  experience  of 
deprivation,  important  in  this  study  because  of  the  way  that 
Chinese hacktivists elicit a strong patriotic connection to China. 
2.2  Social  Identity  Theory  and  Relative 
Deprivation 
It has been argued that relative deprivation, and other negative 
outcomes of individual and group comparisons, can be included 
within the social psychological approach known as social identity 
theory  (Webber  2007;  2010).  The  social  psychologist,  Henri 
Tajfel,  put  forward  the  suggestion,  based  on  his  group 
experiments,  that  intergroup  conflict  could  occur  without 
competition for resources (Tajfel and Wilkes 1963). Identification 
with a group was sufficient to create conflict if comparison with 
another group took place. This was because a social group had the 
need to positively distinguish itself from what became known as 
the outgroup. People needed to create or maintain a positive social 
identity.  More  recently,  this  approach  has  become  more 
sophisticated by moving out of small group experimental studies, 
to look at groups undergoing real social upheaval, such as during 
the negotiations for the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 
(Bond  and  Hewstone  1988). What these studies demonstrate is 
that  in  order  to  understand  crime  or  hacktivism  we  have  to 
understand  the  networks  and  social  context  in  which  people 
operate (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2011; see also Hobbs 
1997 for a review of the literature; Canter and Alison 2000).  
Linking this to the discussion of ressentiment, and the elaboration 
by Musolf and Meltzer, and we would argue that the feelings of 
ressentiment that are encouraged by the Chinese government‟s use 
of National Humiliation as a motivating force, coupled with the 
opportunity afforded by the spread of the Web to mitigate these 
feelings of humiliation through hacktivism, all helps to explain the 
rise of this activity.  
2.3 Nationalism, Patriotism and Hacktivism 
Over the last two centuries, national humiliation propaganda has 
proven to be a very effective, if not the most effective tool for the 
purpose of national unification and recovery in different locations. 
Abraham Lincoln declared a “National Humiliation Day” to unify 
the country during the American Civil War. Gandhi used the same 
strategy to unify India to rise against the British imperialists in 
1919. In China, Mao used it to establish the People‟s Republic of 
China and offered a national salvation by telling the world “Ours 
will  no  longer  be  a  nation  subject  to  insult  and  humiliation” 
(Callahan  2004,  p.203).  Then  in  the  1980s,  the  Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) faced the “three belief crises”: crisis of 
faith in socialism, Marxism and the party itself. This gradually led 
to  an  increasing  demand  for  Western-style  democracy  which 
resulted  in  the  Tiananmen  movement  in  1989.  The  shocked 
Chinese rulers perceived the cause to be the lack of ideological 
and  political  education  and  as  a  result,  a  patriotic  education 
campaign  was launched  in  1991  (Wang  2008,  p.800),  with  the 
goals of “rejuvenating China‟s national spirit, strengthening the 
unity of the people of different ethnic groups, reconstructing the 
sense  of  national  esteem  and  dignity  and  building  the  broadest 
possible coalition under the leadership of the CCP.” (Zhao 1998, 
p.296) 
Initially,  the  patriotic  education  campaign  was limited to youth 
education  and  it  was  implemented  from  kindergartens  to 
universities. According to Zhao (1998, p.292), “…by May 1994, 
more than 95% of primary and middle school students in Beijing 
were organized to watch the patriotic films recommended by the State  Education  Commission”.  Furthermore,  “the  authorities 
launched the „I am Chinese‟ program in universities, which taught 
students  to  be proud of being Chinese by concentrating on the 
„great  achievements‟  of  the  Chinese  people  and  especially  the 
Communist Party” (Zhao 1998, p.293). However, the campaign 
gradually targeted almost everyone including soldiers, farmers and 
workers. 
As Callahan (2004, p.202) has summarised, Chinese nationalism 
is “not just about celebrating the glories of Chinese civilization; it 
also commemorates China‟s weakness. This negative image comes 
out most directly in the discourse of China‟s Century of National 
Humiliation. Chinese books on the topic generally tell the tale of 
China going from being at the centre of the world to being the 
Sick Man of Asia after the Opium War (1840) only to rise again 
with the Communist Revolution (1949)...The discourse of national 
humiliation shows how China‟s insecurities are not just material, a 
matter of catching up to the West militarily and economically, but 
symbolic. Indeed, one of the goals of Chinese foreign policy has 
been to „cleanse National Humiliation”  
Indeed, the most relevant part of this patriotic education campaign 
to  hacktivism  is  the  ways  in  which  the  campaign  “took  every 
opportunity  to  instigate  nationalist  resentment  against  foreign 
pressures” (Zhao 1998 p.297). The aim is to convince the youths 
that  hostile  international  forces  are  doing  all  they  can  to 
undermine  China‟s quest  to  dominance  once  again.  To  achieve 
this  goal,  the  patriotic  education  campaign  was  "designed  to 
present the Chinese youth with detailed information about China's 
traumatic and humiliating experience in the face of Western and 
Japanese incursion" (Wang 2008, p.791). 
This political creation of a sense of historical relative deprivation 
towards foreign forces, which we argue is ressentiment, through 
national  education  programmes,  and  the  coincidence  in  timing 
with the availability of the Internet in the mid-90s are what the 
authors  believe  to  be  the  fundamental  factors  behind  Chinese 
hacktivism.  
As noted by Lacy (2011, p.89), "A group may have a low status 
for a considerable period of time, but only when they perceive that 
to be a degradation will the anger and the need for self-respect 
lead  to  violence".  The  first  major  instance  of  eruption  of  this 
politically constructed ressentiment is evident from Hughes‟ paper 
in which he reports the reactions to the Indonesian riots against 
ethnic Chinese in May 1998 and examines how the Internet was 
used  to  mediate  information  about  the  events  happening  in 
Indonesia.  His  paper  shows  that  there  was  a  strong  reluctance 
from the Chinese state to act over the May 1998 Indonesian riots 
in which many Chinese women were reportedly gang raped and 
murdered. The state banned student protests in China because “the 
ban should be understood in the context of the clamp-down on 
independent political activity in the capital that had been in place 
since the Tiananmen Massacre of 4 June 1989..." (Hughes 2000, 
p.201). This officially shuts out the traditional physical ways in 
which the Chinese citizens could voice their anger over political 
matters. Perhaps most important of all is the paradoxical situation 
that the Chinese state have found themselves in. On the one hand, 
they actively promote nationalism to unite the country. Yet, in the 
political arena, they cannot allow protest in response to political 
events  because  any  form  of  protest  would  subject  the  state  to 
criticisms  and  ultimately  threaten  its  legitimacy  to  rule.  As 
Hughes (2000, p.206) observers, there is an "…increasing need 
for the state to align itself with the nationalistic outbursts that are 
becoming a regular occurrence in Chinese cyberspace. That the 
PRC  state  has  found  itself  increasingly  held  hostage  to  an 
ideology  that  it  has  itself  encouraged  since  the  Tiananmen 
Massacre  was  evident  when  the  authorities  found  themselves 
having to provide buses to ship demonstrators to the anti-NATO 
demonstrations held after the Belgrade bombing". 
Thus, in his paper, Hughes provides a valuable insight into what 
drove  the  Chinese  hacktivists,  which  we  argue  to  be  “the 
generation of patriotic education”, to respond since these are the 
very  first  examples  of  Chinese  hacktivism  and  it  is  these  early 
examples  which  helped  create their  symbolic  status as patriotic 
cyber citizen-warriors. In other words, the internet is a relatively 
safe place for the Chinese government to allow the expression of 
anger  and  which  would  not  provoke  the  same  kind  of  mass 
physical  political  movement  as  happened  at  Tiananmen  and 
elsewhere  in  China  during  1989.  Hacktivism  safely  vents  the 
ressentiment of national humiliation encouraged by the Chinese 
government through the patriotic education programme.   
In the remainder of this paper, we present empirical findings to 
support our argument. 
3.  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
To find empirical proof to support the argument proposed in this 
paper,  the  authors  set  out  to  examine  the  potential  correlation 
between  membership  growth  patterns  of  the  hacktivist  online 
forums and the timing of the political events. As it is proposed in 
this paper that it is the lack of freedom for physical protests which 
has driven some Chinese people to express their emotions online, 
it  is  then  logical  to  hypothesise  that  in  the  event  of  a  major 
political event that has sparked public outcry, hacktivist groups 
should experience a surge in membership growth.  
3.1  Study Setup 
Since the purpose of this study is to examine hacktivism, it was 
decided that online hacktivist forums (or bulletin board systems, 
BBS) would be suitable at this stage of the project and without 
access  to  those  undertaking  hacktivism  directly.  There  are  two 
problems with this data. 
Firstly, the source of data is critical. The Internet Archive
1 and the 
Web  Infomall
2  are  the  two  most  complete  Internet  archives 
available and they are great sources of data when studying old 
web pages, especially those from domains which no longer exist. 
Unfortunately,  during  this  study,  the  Web  Infomall  was 
inaccessible for unknown reasons and so all data presented in this 
study were captured from the Internet Archive  by querying the 
domain names of the hacktivi st forums listed in table 1 . With 
regards  to  the  timing  of  political  events,  this  study  uses 
information primarily from news articles from both the Western 
and Chinese news agencies, in particular, the timeline  of major 
events in China published by the BBC
3.  
Secondly, as shown in table 1, there have been quite a number of 
hacktivist groups which have been formed and disbanded since 
1998 (Henderson 2007). Therefore, there was a need to select our 
target groups. Several factors were considered.  
                                                                  
1http://web.archive.org 
2http://www.infomall.cn 
3http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/country_profiles/1288392.stm 1.  Availability of data: the Green Army would be the most ideal 
subject  as  they  were  the  earliest  group  of  hacktivists. 
Unfortunately,  the  earliest  date  of  data  offered  by  the  Internet 
Archive only dates back to 4
th Feb 2001, which is after the group 
had disbanded. Thus, the Green Army could not be chosen as a 
test subject.  
2.  The  relevance  of  the  group:  considering  the  timing  of  the 
group, the China Eagle Union would be an ideal alternative to the 
Green  Army.  However,  the  presentation  of  the  group  gives  no 
clear indications about their scope of activities. In other words, 
there  is  no  clear  indication  whether  the  group  was  a  pure 
hacktivist organisation. 
Table 1: list of famous hacktivist groups 
Name  Founder  Domain name  Duration 
Green 
Army 
“Goodwill”  isbase.net  1998-
2000 
China 
Eagle 
Union 
Wan Tao  chinawill.com 
chinaeagle.org 
2000-
2005 
H.U.C.  
(1
st gen) 
“lion”  cnhonker.com 
cnhonker.net 
cnhonker.org 
2000-
2004 
H.U.C.  
(2
nd gen) 
“Binger
4”  chinahonker.com  2005 
H.U.C. 
 (3
rd gen) 
“Lyon”  honker.net  2010 - 
present 
H.U.C. 
 (3
th gen) 
“Binger”  cnhonkerarmy.com  2010 - 
present 
 
On the other hand, the relevance of the Honker Union of China 
(H. U. C.) is clear. The H. U. C. was first created by a famous 
Chinese hacktivist known as “lion” in late 2000. It is clear that 
this  is  a  hacktivist  group  purely  dedicated  to  protecting  China 
because they refer to themselves as the “honkers”, which means 
“red hackers”, where red is the national colour. Furthermore, the 
group  also  has  a  strict  code  of  conduct
5  which  includes  the 
following rules: 
  Love your country 
  Strictly forbid attacks against any legitimate institutes 
within the country 
  Treat other honkers as your colleagues and share your 
knowledge 
  Uniformly defend the country and respond to defiant 
acts by foreign countries 
Members of the H. U. C. are encouraged to adhere to those rules 
by the different generations
6 of H. U. C., which are as listed in 
table 2. Therefore, this study focuses on the membership growth 
of the different generations of the H. U. C. from 2001 to 2010. 
                                                                  
4Phonetic translation of the hacker‟s user name “冰儿” 
5http://replay.web.archive.org/20010405092345/http://www.cnho
nker.com/cnhonker.htm 
6http://cnhonkerarmy.com/purpose.htm 
3.2  Hacktivist Forum Membership Growth 
In  this  section,  the  membership  growth  patterns  of  each 
generation of the Honker Union of China (H. U. C.) are presented 
and  correlated  with  the  timing  of  key  political  events  which 
occurred in China. 
3.2.1  First generation of H.U.C. (2001- 2004) 
As already mentioned, there are three generations of the H. U. C. 
and  the  first  generation  was  created  by  “lion”  in  2000. 
Unfortunately,  membership  data  for  the  group  in  2000  is  not 
available on the Internet Archive and data for 2001 is relatively 
incomplete.  Figure  1  shows  the  membership  growth  of  the 
hacktivist forum in 2001. 
 
Figure 1: Membership growth of H. U. C. (2001) 
From  figure  1,  it  can  be  seen  the  group‟s  membership  had  a 
relatively  steady  growth  from  January  to  April  and  a  slight 
increase  followed  before  a  sudden  surge  in  mid-June  which 
continued  beyond  July.  Unfortunately,  the  data  is  the  least 
complete out of all of that presented in this paper and so, it is 
difficult to understand this observation accurately. More precisely, 
between 15
th June 2001 and 23
rd June 2001, it was found that the 
groups‟ membership surged from 9814 to 16099 and from then 
on, the growth rate became much sharper than before.  
Although it is not possible to pinpoint the exact reason for the 
surge between 15
th to 23
rd June, the authors attribute some of the 
reasons  behind  the  increase  in  growth  to  a  major  international 
incident. In early April 2001, a U.S. spy plane collided with a 
Chinese  fighter  which  killed  the  Chinese  pilot.  This  sparked 
outrage across China and subsequently, this led to a hacker war
7 
between U.S. hackers and the Honker Union of China. This was 
widely reported on the news and on 6
th May, the popular news 
portal sina.com published an interview
8 with “lion”.  
The authors believe that this is the key moment for the honkers as 
it was the first time they became known to the general public and 
that  this  is  the  moment  when  the  label  “honkers”  became 
associated with online proactive patriots. Naturally, this led to a 
membership growth. Clearly, these are people who are aware of 
hacktivism,  and  are  sufficiently  motivated  to  either  join,  or 
partake in hacktivist attacks. It is beyond the scope of the present 
study to outline the demographic characteristics and motivations 
of these members.  
Then on 20
th June 2001, Taiwan test-fired the Patriot anti-missile 
defence system while in the same month, China held a military 
exercise  simulating  island  invasions.  There  was  a  growing 
                                                                  
7http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1322839.stm 
8http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/c/65747.shtml concern that China would invade Taiwan. The authors speculate 
that this tension added further to the ressentiment already built up 
in the Chinese people during the conflict with the U.S. and with 
the knowledge of the existence of a hacktivist forum on which 
people  take  a  proactive  approach  towards  political  matters,  it 
would have been natural for them to start flocking to the site in 
order to express their emotions. 
Oddly, the group was temporarily closed between the end of 2002 
and early 2003 but was re-launched from May 2003 to end of 
2004. The interesting aspect of this second launch of the H. U. C. 
by “lion” is that unlike in 2001, the membership growth of group 
remained relatively steady throughout 2003 - 2004, as represented 
by the straight line graph shown in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Membership growth of cnhonker.com (2003-2004) 
The relatively steady and slower growth during the period from 
2003 to 2004 can be explained by the fact that China‟s foreign 
relations  were  relatively  stable  and  that  domestic  events 
dominated, including the Sars virus outbreak and the first Chinese 
moon landing. 
On 31
st Dec 2004, “lion” disbanded the H. U. C. and this was the 
end of the first generation. 
3.2.2  Second generation of H.U.C. (2005) 
Soon after “lion” disbanded the first generation of the H.U.C., it 
was then regrouped by another person known as “Binger” in early 
2005. The membership growth of this group is shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Membership growth of chinahonker.com 
As evident from figure 3, this second generation experienced a 
sudden surge in membership in April. In detail, the membership 
surged from 9945 on 19
th Apr 2005 to 30151 on 26th Apr 2005, a 
203% increase in 17 days.  
This surge is also reflected by Google Trends, as shown in figure 
4. This figure shows the volume of searches for the search terms 
“honkers” and “honkers union” in China in 2005. 
 
Figure 4: Google Trends for search terms "honker" and 
"honker union" in China in 2005 
Thus,  it  has  been  shown  that  there  was  a  sudden  increase  in 
demand  for  the  hacktivists  from  mid-April  to  late  April.  The 
authors believe that there were two reasons for this. Firstly, there 
was  a  mass  outcry  happening  at  the  time  over  the  Japanese 
Education Ministry‟s attempt to omit the atrocities committed by 
the Japanese Imperial Army in WWII from textbooks. Thus, there 
was a surge in ressentiment. Secondly, on 22
nd April, a popular 
portal, qq.com reported
9 that the Honkers Union of China had in 
fact already regrouped after its disbandment at the end of 2004. 
Therefore, it is the authors‟ belief that the surge is attributable to 
the strong ressentiment over Japan at the time and the news of the 
regroup drove those in need of expressing their emotions to the H. 
U. C. as they already knew about the group‟s proactive patriotism 
from 2001.  
This generation of the H. U. C. disbanded at the end of August 
2004.  
3.2.3  Third generation of H.U.C. (2010 – present) 
In  2010,  there  were  two  separate  groups  claiming  to  be  the 
Honkers Union of China: honker.net (previous domain name was 
chinesehonker.org)  was  launched  in  June  2009  and 
cnhonkerarmy.com was launched in June 2010. 
 
Figure 5 - Percentage of daily global reach to the forums 
[Source:  Alexa Internet (www.alexa.com)] 
On the 7
th September, the Chinese captain of a fishing trawler was 
detained by the Japanese navy near the Diaoyu Islands. Almost 
predictably,  this  caused  a  public  outcry  in  China.  Thus,  the 
authors hypothesised that this event should also lead to a surge in 
membership  for  the  two  hacktivist  forums.  Unfortunately,  the 
Internet Archive could not provide the archived pages for either of 
                                                                  
9 http://tech.qq.com/a/20050422/000071.htm the forums and so the authors had no choice but to turn to Alexa
10 
and  studied  the  Web  traffic  data  instead.  The   data  on  the 
percentage of daily global reach of both forums  is as shown in 
figure 5.  
It is evident from the figure that during mid-September, there was 
an unusually sharp surge in reach for both forums and this surge is 
found to have coincided with a hacktivist rallying call
11 published 
on the 11
th September, on a forum dedicated to China‟s fight for 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. This rallying call was made 
by someone proclaiming to be one of the founding members of 
honker.net  and  asked  people  to  participate  in  a  forthcoming 
cyberattack  on  Japan  planned  for  the  18
th  September.  18
th 
September  2001  was  also  the  date  which  marked  the  79
th 
anniversary  of  the  “Manchurian  Incident”  which  is  said  to  be 
staged by the Japanese as the pretext to the invasion of China.  
However, what does this surge in daily reach mean?  
Figures 6 and 7 present some interesting insights into the sudden 
surge  in  daily  reach.  Although  honker.net  received  the  highest 
surge  in  traffic,  figure  6  shows  that  it  was  cnhonkerarmy.com 
which experienced the highest surge in the average time visitors 
spent  on  the  site.  Similarly,  figure  7  shows  that  it  was 
cnhonkerarmy.com which experienced the highest increase in the 
number of daily unique page views by the visitors. 
 
Figure 6: Average time spent on site (minutes) on Chinese 
hacktivist forums in the last twelve months [Source:  Alexa 
Internet (www.alexa.com)] 
 
Figure 7: Average daily unique page views per user on 
Chinese hacktivist sites over the last twelve months. [Source:  
Alexa Internet (www.alexa.com)] 
                                                                  
10 http://www.alexa.com 
11 http://www.cfdd.org.cn/bbs/thread-71680-1-1.html 
There  are  two  reasons  for  honker.net‟s  greater  surge  in  daily 
reach: firstly, the Web address of the forum was featured on the 
rallying call. Secondly, on 13
th Sept, the founder of honker.net 
“Lyon” published an official notice saying that the rallying call 
had  nothing  to  do  with  honker.net  and  that  he  believes  such 
attacks add no value to the country
12. Subsequently on the 15
th 
September,  this  notice  by  “Lyon”  featured  in  the  news
13  on 
sina.com. As honker.net has had such wide exposure, it is not 
surprising to find that it had experience a surge in reach.  
On the other hand, cnhonkerarmy.com did not feature in the 
media and yet it also experienced a surge in traffic. This indicates 
that those who were  more familiar with  hacktivism were also 
seeking out websites that were not mentioned in the media.  This 
eliminates a potential counter-argument that the surge in global 
reach was due to mere hype at the time.  In addition, the surge in 
the length of time spent on the site and the average number of  
pages viewed by its visitors as well as the surge in daily reach may 
be attributed to the fact that cnhonkerarmy .com had announced 
details of their own set of attacks on Japan, as shown in figure 8.  
Therefore, it may be argued that cnhonkerarmy .com‟s  general 
growth in all three Web traffic benchmarks reflects the users‟ need 
to express their emotions in the form of symbolic cyber attacks. 
This supports Nietzsche and Scheler‟s view of ressentiment “as 
embodying an intense desire for revenge…Both also stressed the 
inability of those experiencing ressentiment to rebel against the 
agents  of  their  unjust  treatment,  who  are  more  powerful. 
Imaginary or symbolic revenge, however, may often take the place 
of actual retaliation.” (Meltzer and Musolf 2002, p.248). 
 
Figure 8: Screenshot of a defaced Japanese website published 
on cnhonkerarmy.com 
Furthermore, figures 6 and 7 also provide crucial insights into the 
behavior of the users on hacktivist forums at the time of major 
political events. The sharp increase in both the average time spent 
and the average daily unique pageviews per visitor demonstrate 
that during a major political event, the members of the hacktivist 
forums  would  become  more  active  on  the  forums.  Thus,  this 
serves as evidence for Jasper‟s claim that “Emotions are part of a 
flow of action and interaction, not simply the prior motivations to 
engage or the outcomes that follow.” (Jasper 2010, p.16). 
                                                                  
12 http://www.honker.net/News/Notice/2010-09-13/4908.html 
13 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2010-09-15/17134659907.shtml  
Figure 9: Google Trends for terms "honker" and "honker 
union" in China over the last six years 
Lastly, figure 9 shows the search volume for the terms “honkers” 
and “honkers union” over the last six years. As shown, the search 
volumes surges in around April in 2005, then around June in 2010 
and  September  in  2010.  While  the  surges  in  April  2005  and 
September 2010 are linked to political events happening at the 
time, the surge in June 2010 can be attributed to the news that 
cnhonkerarmy.com  was  formed.  Therefore,  figure  9  serves  as 
further proof to the argument presented in this paper that people 
are  driven  to  hacktivist  forums  at  the  times  of  major  political 
events due to their need to express their ressentiment. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have taken a novel approach to a phenomenon 
that has hitherto been rendered as a moral panic, with hacktivists 
as folk devils intent on global Armageddon.  We have argued that 
the form that hacktivism takes in China is bounded and shaped by 
social and historical influences, and these have accelerated since 
the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. We have found a fit with 
various  criminological  theories,  as  well  as  political  and 
sociological  approaches.    Political  demonstrations  against  the 
ruling  communist  party  in 1989 led the government to create a 
national patriotic education programme highlighting the way that 
China  had  suffered  national  humiliation.  This  sense  of  social 
ressentiment  becomes  piqued  when  an  incident  occurs  that 
threatens the  national  identity.  The  paradox is that the patriotic 
education programme encourages in-group solidarity and antipathy 
towards  the  out-group,  but  this  can  rarely  be  expressed  in 
demonstrations because the government fears a new Tiananmen. 
Hacktivism  in  China  developed  at  about  the  same  time  as  the 
education  programme  started  to  be  rolled  out,  and  in  order  to 
demonstrate that this is not just a coincidence, we have also shown 
how activity on hacktivist forums rises and falls during incidents 
of perceived national threat. Hacktivism therefore becomes a safe 
outlet to vent patriotic anger, and so hacktivism is not encouraged 
by the state, but tolerated.  
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